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The Impact of Digital Convergence on Firms’ Strategies:  
Integrated vs. Separated Firms 
 
  
 
Abstract 
Digital convergence which means the convergence of industry areas related to digital technologies 
is an important phenomenon in business, which will decide the fates of firms in the near future. The 
only firms which can create synergy effects from digital convergence are expected to be the winners in 
the fierce competition of digital convergence era. In our analysis, we examine the strategy of an 
integrated firm which has businesses in two different industry areas which are related to each other. 
By using a game theoretical model, we show how the integrated firm can win over two single 
separated firms which have business in only one industry area each by leveraging the two businesses 
the integrated firm has. In our welfare analysis, we also show that this convergence may be even 
beneficial to consumers, which seems counter-intuitive to social concerns about anti-competitive 
behaviors by integrated firms. Additionally, we compare product convergence to industry convergence, 
and suggest that firms be more careful for product convergence than industry convergence because 
product convergence cannot be as efficient as industry convergence in terms of combination of 
different product functions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Big Bang! Digital convergence is finally happening -- and that means new opportunities for 
upstarts and challenges for tech icons”  
‘Baker & Green in Business week, June 21, 2004’ 
 
CEO of Apple Computer, Steve Jobs, who was ousted from his post, could come back to the company 
with the success of iPod portable music player and iTunes online music stores. He pointed out the 
value of iPod and iTunes combined and delivered to customers made big hits. Nowadays, the digital 
convergence between MP3 (MPEG Audio Layer-3) portable music player and MP3 online music 
stores such as iPod and iTunes has been claimed to cause the birth of a brand new era.  
In fact, in the recent years, rapid developments in information technologies are driving them towards a 
“Digital Convergence” a unification of the functions, and a combination of the previously distinct 
digital technologies (Yoffie 1997). There are four categories of digital convergence; digital 
convergence of information, device, network, and industry. Among these kinds of digital convergence, 
our study concentrates on digital convergence of industry and focuses on the analysis of separated but 
digitally related products. In this paper, we analyze the competition in the presence of digital 
convergence of industry, a phenomenon of the convergence of industry areas which deal with related 
digital technologies.  
In our analysis, we provide a game theoretic model and examine the strategy of an integrated firm 
which has businesses in two different industry areas which are related to each other. We show how the 
integrated firm can win over two single firms which have business in only one industry area each by 
leveraging the two businesses the firm has. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, 
we briefly review the studies related to our study. Section 3 presents basic modeling framework for a 
monopolistic model of an integrated firm and two separate firms in two digitally related industry areas. 
Section 4 describes the optimal strategy of digital convergence, and pricing strategies between the 
integrated firm and the separate firms are analyzed. Section 5 shows comparison between industry 
convergence and product convergence. Section 6 concludes with a summary of the managerial 
implications of our results and a brief discussion of future work. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Convergence is an often used but rarely defined concept. Ideas such as the creation of synergies, 
disappearance of industry boundaries, integration, or overlapping of markets, are all used to describe 
this phenomenon. Where is convergence occurring and what effects has this phenomenon for the 
industries involved? Convergence has been widely used in management practice in the IT, 
telecommunication and media industries the last decades. A working definition of convergence could 
be something like: “merging of hitherto separated markets, removing entry barriers across industry 
boundaries.” The popular illustration of convergence was four circles representing the IT, 
telecommunication, media and consumer electronic industries moving into each other, creating on big 
“converging industry” 
From the analysis of the multiple dimensions, it is possible to define two basic forms of convergence: 
convergence in substitutes and convergence in complements. According to Greenstein and Khanna 
(1997), both products converge in substitutes when customers consider both products to be 
interchangeable with each other. This form of convergence occurs if different companies develop 
features of their products that make them similar to certain other products. It also appears, when 
companies develop standardized bundles of components to perform a certain range of functions, e.g. a 
company merges a monitor, keyboard, central processing unit, and a telephone to form a complete 
communication system. 
Convergence in complements is the case when both products work better and more efficiently together 
than separately. It occurs when different companies develop standardized products or systems that 
interact to form a larger system. In this case, the components perform a combined function which none 
of them could do alone. The combination of these technologies creates a service that did not exist 
before. Thus, the output of this system can potentially be larger than the sum of the output of its parts. 
In both cases, the products are often unrelated and start to converge in complements or substitutes over 
time. An example for convergence in complements is the recent large-scale emergence of online-
databases. These products unify two formerly distinct technologies: advanced online transaction 
computing technology and data compression methods for telecommunication (Greenstein and Khanna 
1997). 
The one of criteria which distinguishes between some generic types of digital convergence is the 
relationship between the respective markets. According to the relationship, digital convergence can be 
classified to complementary product convergence and substitutive product convergence (Stieglitz, 
2003). Among them, our model is more similar to the case of complement and our study does not 
focus on the integration of technologies or products but on the convergence between industry areas 
(especially in our study, we explain our results with an example of the convergence between consumer 
electronics industry and online music contents industry). 
Convergence can reduce total surplus, since a monopolistic firm would provide a much higher level of 
product scope when faced with the same demand and cost of scope; however, the firm would also 
appropriate most or all of this higher level of surplus, leaving very little for the consumer (Mantena 
and Sundararajan, 2004). However, we show here that complementary digital convergence between 
two industry areas is beneficial to consumers. 
While convergence can be a source of increased competition if it creates new entry incentives and 
opportunities in each others’ markets, increased concentration may reduce competition if there are 
significant economies of scope (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1997). In theory, the concept of digital 
convergence has been known for decades. Scientists of various fields have predicted the coming of the 
digital revolution and have tried to assess its implications on industry and society (Baldwin et al. 1996, 
Yoffie, 1997). 
However, it was not until a few years ago that digital convergence started to gain practical importance. 
At that time, large numbers of high-performance digital components were brought onto the market at 
relatively low costs, which facilitated the rate of adoption of these technologies in a variety of different 
products (Duysters and Hagedoorn 1997). 
Network externalities have long been considered to be the primary factors that differentiate the “new 
economy” from the traditional economy (Arthur 1996). And network externalities and economies of 
scale are decisive factors for firms’ pricing strategy (Bakos 1997). More importantly, with network 
effects, an increased market share does not translate into higher profits. Contradictory to conventional 
wisdom, our results indicate that in a static market, consumers rather than firms benefit from 
increasing network externalities with competitive effects outweighing the surplus-extraction abilities 
of firms (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999). Likewise, our model shows that those effects cause 
consumers to have more benefits than firms. 
It shows several possible sources of these positive consumption externalities. The consumption 
externalities may be generated through a direct physical effect of the number of purchasers on the 
quality of the product (e.g. Telephone network). There may be indirect effects that give rise to 
consumption externalities such as trend, brand power, and popularity. In all of these cases, the utility 
that given consumer derives from the good depends on the number of other consumers who are in the 
same “network” as is he or she. The scope of the network that gives rise to the consumption 
externalities will vary across markets (Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
 
 3. The Basic Model 
 
3.1 The Integrated Firm 
 
There is a firm (integrated firm) which produces two products which are related to each other in two 
different industry areas. The firm sells two kinds of products: a portable music player (e.g. iPod), and 
downloadable MP3 music files through online pay-sites (e.g. iTunes). The music file sold through the 
online site is a complementary good of the portable music player. The firm charges a price PP|I for 
portable music player and a price PT|I for the downloadable music file through online payment site. For 
the firm, when they sell their two products, portable music player and music file, they bear variable 
cost CVP (CVT) and fixed cost CFP (CFT) respectively. Because two products are related to each other 
closely, each product’s demand affects on another product’s demand respectively. When the mutual 
effects are arranged with respect to the price levels of two products, the demand of two products can 
be represented as equation (1) and (2). We assume that the demand functions are continuous and linear 
across each price. Thus the demand functions for music player and music file are given by 
 
| | |P I P I T Iq k P Pα γ= − −  (1) 
| | |T I T I P Iq l P Pβ δ= − −  (2) 
 
When the price of music player increases, the demand of music player, qP|I,, decreases by the 
responsiveness parameter for music player, α. Similarly, when the price of music file increases, the 
demand decreases by the responsive parameter for music files, γ.  These parameters mean price 
elasticity of demand. The price elasticity equals to negative demand variation over price variation 
( ( / )demand priceε = − ∆ ∆ ). α is the price of music player elasticity of music player demand. β is the 
price of music file elasticity of music file. γ is the price of music file elasticity of music player, and δ is 
the price of music player elasticity of music file 
( | |/P I P Iq Pα = ∆ ∆ , | |/P I T Iq Pγ = ∆ ∆ , | |/T I T Iq Pβ = ∆ ∆ , | |/T I P Iq Pδ = ∆ ∆ ). All responsiveness parameters have its own 
value between zero and one (0 < α, β, γ, δ < 1). The responsiveness parameter for music player α is 
greater than the responsiveness parameter for music file β, and the responsiveness parameter for music 
player δ is greater than the responsiveness parameter for music file γ, because the slope of music 
player’s demand curve is steeper than that of music file’s demand curve (α > β, δ > γ). The high value 
of parameter means the steeper slope, that is, the demand is more sensitive to the variation of price. 
The responsiveness parameter for music player α and music file β are greater than the responsiveness 
parameter for music file γ and for music player δ, because α, β affects the demand directly and γ, δ 
affects the demand indirectly (α, β > γ , δ). Thus these conditions arranged as α > β > δ > γ. 
 
The benefit to buyers who purchase a music player and a music file from buying in the integrated firm 
is affected by price charged for a music player and a music file. So, the demand reduces as price 
increases ( | | 0/P I P Iq P <∂ ∂ , | | 0/P I T Iq P <∂ ∂ , | | 0/T I T Iq P <∂ ∂ , | | 0/T I P Iq P <∂ ∂ ). We assume that the direct effect of 
changes in PP|I (PT|I) on qP|I (qT|I) is greater than the indirect effect of changes in PT|I (PP|I) on qP|I (qT|I) 
like parameters comparison as mentioned before | | | | | | | |,  / / / /( )P I P I P I T I T I T I T I P Iq P q P q P q P< <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ .We 
assume that the second order conditions with respect to each price PP|I (PT|I) are negative for concavity 
of music player’s and music file’s profit functions 2 2| | ,( 0/P I P IPπ <∂ ∂  
2 2 2 2 2 2
| | | | | | ,0,  0 0)/ / /P I T I T I T I T I P IP P Pπ π π< < <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ .  
The optimal prices can be calculated from the first order conditions. We take the first order conditions 
of total profit function with respect to each price PP|I (PT|I) because the integrated firm sells the 
digitally converged products. This is different from the separate firm’s case where they sell products at 
price levels which maximize profit from each product. Unlike the case of the integrated firm, we take 
the first order conditions of each profit function with respect to each price PP|S (PT|S), because they can 
not sell their products as digitally converged products. Taking the first order conditions leads to the 
following optimal price for music player and music file. Then we can use these prices to determine the 
optimal profits of the firm for each product respectively. 
 
*
| 2
2 ( ) {2 ( )} ( )
4 ( )
P T
V V
P I
k l c c
P
β δ γ αβ γ δ γ β γ δ
αβ γ δ
− + + − + − −
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− +
 (3) 
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Plugging the optimal prices * *| |,  P I T IP P  defined into profit functions results in the optimal profit 
functions * *| |,  P I T Iπ π . 
 
* * * *
| | | |( )( )
P P
P I P I V P I T I FP k P P cc α γπ = − − −−  (5) 
 
* * * *
| | | |( )( )
T T
T I T I V T I P I FP l P P cc β δπ = − − −−  (6) 
 
The notation used in the paper is summarized in Table1.  
 
Notation Description 
   
k
l
 
Potential demand of iPod buyers 
Potential demand of iTunes buyers 
 
,  
,  
α β
γ δ
 
Responsiveness parameter of iPod 
Responsiveness parameter of iTunes 
| |
| |
,  
,  
P I P S
T I T S
P P
P P
 
Price of iPod    (Integrated, Separate) 
Price of iTunes   (Integrated, Separate) 
| |
| |
,  
,  
P I P S
T I T S
q q
q q
 
Quantity of iPod (Integrated, Separate) 
Quantity of iTunes (Integrated, Separate) 
| |
| |
,  
,  
P I P S
T I T S
π π
π π
 
Profit of iPod (Integrated, Separate) 
Profit of iTunes (Integrated, Separate) 
 ,  
P T
V Vc c  Variable cost of iPod and iTunes 
 ,  
P T
F Fc c  
Fixed cost of iPod and iTunes 
 
Table 1.  Notation 
 
3.1 The Separate Firm 
 
Until now, we derive the optimal prices and profits for the integrated firm. From now, we derive the 
optimal prices and profits for two single firms which sell single product in only industry area each. In 
order to develop a fair comparison between the integrated firm and the separate firm, we assume that 
conditions are the same as the integrated firm’s. 
 
 | | |P S P S T Sq k P Pα γ= − −  (7) 
 | | |T S T S P Sq l P Pβ δ= − −  (8) 
 
On the contrary to the integrated firm, we take the first order conditions of each profit function with 
respect to each price | |,  P S T SP P .  
 
*
|
2 2
4
P T
V V
P S
k l c c
P
β γ αβ βγ
αβ γδ
− + −
=
−
 (9) 
 
*
|
2 2
4
T P
V V
T S
l k c c
P
α δ αβ αδ
αβ γδ
− + −
=
−
 (10) 
 
Plugging the optimal prices * *| |,  P S T SP P  defined into profit functions results in the optimal profit 
functions * *| |,  P S T Sπ π .  
 
* * * *
| | | |( )( )
P P
P S P S V P S T S FP k P P cc α γπ = − − −−  (11) 
 
* * * *
| | | |( )( )
T T
T S T S V T S P S FP l P P cc β δπ = − − −−  (12) 
 
Next, we examine comparison of the integrated firm and the separate firm with pricing strategy and 
surplus level. 
 
 
4. Comparative Analysis 
 
4.1 Pricing Strategy 
 
Proposition 1. The optimal unit price of music player for the integrated firm is less than that for the 
separate firm while the optimal unit price of music file for the integrated firm is greater than that 
for the separate firm. 
 From the results we have got above, we can see that the optimal price of music player for the 
integrated firm is less than that for the separate firm ( * *| |P I P SP P∴ < ). Meanwhile, the optimal price of 
music file for the integrated firm is greater than that for the separate firm ( * *| |T I T SP P∴ > ).  
 
In our study which develops the model in static and single period game, the integrated firm adjusts the 
price of music player lower than that of the separate firm. Then, the firm expects the increasing 
demand of music players resulting from the lower price. Even though the firm may lose profits from 
music player part, the increased demand of music players affects the demand of music file positively 
because of network externalities. With this increased demand, the integrated firm can increase the 
price of music file. If so, what would be the levels of the integrated firm’s total profits, profit from the 
sales of music players and music files when compared to those of separated firms? The levels depend 
on the level of demand and the level of the profit from each product. The proposition related to these 
comparisons is as follows. 
 
Proposition 2. Even though the profit from music player for the integrated firm is less than that for 
the separate firm, total profit of the integrated firm is greater than the sum of profits of two separate 
firms.  
 
From the results we have got, we can see that the integrated firm’s profit partly from music player is 
less than that of the separated firm selling music player ( * *| |P I P Sπ π∴ < ). Meanwhile, the integrated 
firm’s profit partly from music file is greater than that of the optimal profit of the separate firm *|T Sπ  
( * *| |T I T Sπ π∴ > ). By comparing the sum of profits of two separate firms * *| |( )P S T Sπ π+  and the total profit 
of the integrated firm * *| |( )P I T Iπ π+ , we find that the total profit of the integrated firm is greater than the 
sum of profits of two separate firms * * * *| | | | 0(( ) ( ) )P I T I P S T Sπ π π π >+ − + . These results show that the 
integrated firm compensates the loss profit of one good by increased profit of another good and gain 
even more than total profit of the separate firm. 
 
Next, we examine how the digital convergence of the integrated firm’s optimal pricing strategies and 
optimal profits has effect on surpluses. 
 
 
4.2 Surplus Level 
 
We now compare the surpluses generated by the integrated firm and the two separate firms. 
 
Proposition 3. The total surplus generated by the integrated firm is greater than the sum of 
surpluses generated by the two separate firms.  
 
 Firstly, we compare consumer surplus of the integrated firm and the separate firms. For consumer 
surplus from buying music player, when we compare consumer surplus from the separate firm selling 
music player ( * |P SCS ) and from the integrated firm ( *|P ICS ), we find that the surplus from the integrated 
firm is greater * *| | 0( )P I P SCS CS >− . This comparison is intuitive and the result which consumer surplus 
from buying goods of lower price is beneficial is out of doubt. However, for consumer surplus from 
buying music file, when we compare consumer surplus from the separate firm selling music files 
( *|T SCS ) and from the integrated firm ( *|T ICS ), we find that the surplus from the integrated firm is 
smaller * *| | 0( )T I T SCS CS <− . This implies that consumers who buy only one good with higher price such as 
music files from the integrated firm may have fewer surpluses compared to consumers who buy the 
good from the separate firm. We address this result to point out that misfit costs may occur on 
consumers who do not want both goods provided by the integrated firm in digitally convergent 
environment. 
 
Social welfare can be expressed as the sum of the surpluses obtained by the profits of the integrated 
firm and those of the separate firm, and consumer surplus from the integrated firm and those from the 
separate firm * * * * * * * *| | | | | |( ( ) ( ),  ( )I P I T I P I T I S P S T SSW CS CS SWπ π π π+ + + += = * *| |( ))P S T SCS CS+ + . 
The comparison of social welfares generated by the integrated firm and separate firms shows that the 
integrated firm’s social welfare is greater than the separate firm’s one ( * *I SSW SW> ). In fact, the 
difference of total consumer surplus with the integrated firm and with two separated firms is greater 
than the difference of total profits of the integrated firm and two separated firms. In other words, 
consumers get more benefits rather than the integrated firm. Moreover, this effect is influenced by 
network externalities. To explain the effect of network externalities, we show a figure. Figure 1 shows 
that the difference of total social welfare between the integrated firm and the separate firms. When the 
levels of potential demands are low, the difference is not noticeable, but as potential demand music 
player k and music file l increase, the difference in terms of total social welfare increases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 :       ( )
 :       ( )
 :      
Axis x Potential demand of music player k
Axis y Potential demand of music file l
Axis z Difference of total social welfare
Figure 1. Difference of Total Social Welfare 
 
Figure 1 shows much more differences between them in the high level of potential demands. For 
simplicity, we restrict the degree of difference (z axis).  
 
 
5. Business Implications: Industry Convergence vs. Product Convergence 
 
In this study, we analyze the impact of digital convergence on firms’ pricing strategy and consumer 
surplus when firms produce digitally complementary goods such as a portable music player and 
downloadable MP3 music files through online pay-sites. We show that a strategy of selling digital-
converged goods together yields higher profits and the integrated firm can offer lower price. Besides, 
the integrated firm can increases the competitiveness of it with network externalities. 
Prior to making comparison between industry convergence and product convergence, we begin by 
introducing product convergence in substitute and complementary perspectives. A product 
convergence of substitutes is the classical case of one industry offering product functions which 
rapidly evolve into a close substitute to another existing market. Technology-intensive example is the 
present PDA and mobile phone industries. With the advent of the 3G standard, there will be 
considerable product convergence between PDA and mobile phones since they increasingly offer the 
same functions. A product convergence of complementarities occurs if existing products or services 
become complementary to each other. 
If the number of the product which is digitally converged to another product is one, this can be 
interpreted as product convergence of two goods by one to one matching such as camera phone. In this 
case, compared to industry convergence where the number can be internally decided to produce 
optimal outcomes, product convergence may bring about negative effects. Interestingly, we easily find 
these cases in industry areas of mobile phone and PDA. During the last two years, super phones which 
have multiple functions such as Digital camera, DMB (Digital Multimedia Broadcasting), MP3P, and 
Vehicle Navigation were very popular in mobile phone markets in the world. As time goes by, 
however, mobile phones come to have the more functions, their shape becomes larger and more 
expensive. In addition, some customers become aware of troubles from its expensive price and 
inconvenience. Finally, firms such as Motorola started to provide phones with simple functions and 
cheaper prices as their main products and became successful in mobile phone market. The advent of 
Motorola’s simple phone RAZR was a shock in mobile phone market. RAZR solved consumers suffer 
from complicate functions and much higher price and hit the jackpot. Another case of RAZR would be 
the story of Blackberry for short message service in U.S. Those two products solved inefficiency of 
product convergence and they could be a great success in their industry. 
More theoretically, the product convergence of substitutes having similar functions such as e-mail, 
Internet access, and schedule management may cannibalize each market’s demand. In technical 
perspective, the mobile phone of the specific function can not be superior to a product of the function 
in quality. (e.g. The digital camera function in mobile phone is more expensive and worse than that of 
Digital Camera.) As Bakos & Brynjolfsson (1999) show, the strategy to bundle functions becomes 
more inefficient as more and more functions are converged and variable costs to include those 
functions increases. 
So, compared to industry convergence, firms must be more cautious when they consider convergence 
of products because product convergence cannot be as efficient as industry convergence in terms of 
combination of different business functions.  
  
6. Discussions and Conclusions 
 
We have examined how a firm should design and develop their products in severely competitive 
markets in digital convergence era. We show how the prices of digitally converged products of the 
integrated firms are different from those of the separated firms. Additionally, our theoretical analyses 
show the effect of the digital convergence on the integrated firm’s optimal pricing strategies, optimal 
profits and customer surplus. 
Our results show that customers who purchase digitally converged products from the integrated firm 
have more total surplus than customers who purchase the products from the separate firms. However, 
we also show that the surplus by buying one product from the integrated firm may be less than that by 
buying one product from the separated firm. Even though, in total surpluses, the customers who buy 
digitally converged products from the integrated firm have more surpluses, the surplus of the 
customers who buy only one of the products whose price by the integrated firm is higher than the price 
by the separated firm may be less. Likewise, the integrated firm itself gains positive profit from only 
some part of products even though the total profits from the whole markets would be greater than the 
sum of profits of separate firms.  
We find that consumers rather than firms benefit from digitally converged products with increasing 
network externalities. This finding also corresponds with that of Viswanathan (2005). In the 
comparison of the difference of firms’ profits and the difference of consumer surpluses, the difference 
of consumer surpluses is greater than the difference of profits. That is, the network externalities with 
digital convergence have more positive effects on consumer surplus than firms’ profits. 
Because, for simplicity of analysis, our model assumes a monopolistic market to focus on the 
comparison of pricing strategies of the integrated firm and the separated firms, the generalizability of 
our results may be limited to be applied to firms in competition. Our further study may consider 
competition among firms and further empirical validation of our analytical results.
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